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I. The background to the Guiding Principle 
The 2003 OECD Commentary on Article 1 raised two questions 
with respect to improper use of tax treaties1. The first question 
was whether tax treaty benefits must be granted when transactions 
entered into by taxpayer’s abuse the provisions of tax treaties and 
the second question is whether domestic anti abuse measures, 
that are intended to prevent abuse, conflict with tax treaties2. 
In relation to the second question, the Commentary makes a 
reference to Para 22.1 and provides that as a general rule and 
having regard to para 9.5, there will be no conflict3. 
With respect to the first question, Para 9.2 provides that several 
States consider that taxes are levied through domestic law as 
restricted by tax treaties. Thus, for these States an abuse of tax 
treaty can be considered as an abuse of domestic law. Accordingly, 
for these States the issue then becomes whether the provisions of 
tax treaties may prevent the application of the domestic anti-abuse 
provisions. In this regard the Commentary, by referring to Para 
22.1, provides that domestic anti avoidance rules, in general, do 
not conflict with tax treaties4. 
Also, with respect to the first question, Para 9.3 provides that 
other States tackle treaty abuse by a proper construction of tax 
treaties. This construction results from the object and purpose 
of tax treaties (which includes prevention of tax avoidance)5 as 
well as the obligation to interpret them in good faith pursuant 
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to Article 31 of the Vienna Convention of 
the Law on Treaties (VCLT)6. 
The Commentary then concludes in Para 9.4 
that, irrespective of the approach followed 
by the first or second group of States, the 
benefit of tax treaties should not be granted 
to arrangements that constitute an abuse7. 
The Commentary does not elaborate on what 
is an abusive arrangement. Nevertheless, in 
Para 9.5 the Commentary introduces a guiding 
principle that provides “that the benefits of a 
double taxation convention should not be available 
where a main purpose (subjective element) for 
entering into certain transactions or arrangements 
was to secure a more favourable tax position 
and obtaining that more favourable treatment 
in these circumstances would be contrary to the 
object and purpose of the relevant provisions 
(objective element)”8.
II. The background to the Principal Purpose 
Test 
In February 2013, the OECD released its report 
on Addressing Base Erosion and Profit Shifting 
(BEPS)9. Subsequently, in July 2013, the OECD 
released its 15-point Action Plan to address 
BEPS10. In this plan, treaty abuse, in particular, 
treaty shopping was considered to be one of 
the most important sources of BEPS concerns. 
Accordingly, Action 6 was dedicated to prevent 
treaty abuse. Thereafter, in March 2014, the 
OECD released its discussion draft on Action 
611. Following a two-day public consultation 
in April – the OECD released its report on 
treaty abuse (2014 TTA report) as part of its 
seven deliverables due in September 201412. It 
is clearly indicated that the recommendations 
made in the report are at a draft stage and 
further refinement is necessary13. Essentially, 
the report suggests treaty anti abuse rules 
and provides clarificatory commentary for 
domestic anti abuse rules. 
With respect to treaty measures, the 2014 
TTA Report suggests a three-prong approach 
to counter treaty shopping. Firstly, the title 
and preamble of tax treaties is modified to 
clearly include a statement that when States 
enter into tax treaties their intention is not 
to create opportunity for tax avoidance or 
evasion including treaty-shopping arrangements. 
Secondly, a treaty targeted anti avoidance rule 
(TAAR) in line with the US style limitation 
of benefits (LOB) clause is proposed to be 
included in tax treaties. Thirdly, a treaty 
general anti avoidance rule (GAAR) in the 
form of a principal purpose test (PPT), which 
resembles the guiding principle, is proposed.
The PPT clause provides that: “Notwithstanding 
the other provisions of this Convention, a benefit 
under this Convention shall not be granted in 
respect of an item of income or capital if it 
is reasonable to conclude, having regard to all 
relevant facts and circumstances, that obtaining 
that benefit was one of the principal purposes 
(subjective element) of any arrangement or 
transaction that resulted directly or indirectly in 
that benefit, unless it is established that granting 
that benefit in these circumstances would be in 
accordance with the object and purpose of the 
relevant provisions of this Convention” (objective 
element). 14 Other Treaty TAAR’s are also 
proposed. 
With respect to the interaction of domestic anti 
abuse measures with tax treaties, it is stated 
that States apply domestic Anti-avoidance 
Measures to avoid domestic BEPS concerns. 
In many situations, taxpayers argue that such 
measures conflict with tax treaties as treaties 
rank at a higher pedestal than domestic law. 
The report provides that a conflict does not 
arise between domestic anti abuse rules and 
tax treaties by referring to the comments made 
in the 2003/2014 Commentary to Article 1 in 
Paras 22.1 and 9.515. The report also provides 
that the conclusions already reflected in the 
Commentary on Article 1 on the interaction 
between treaties and domestic anti abuse 
measures remain applicable even if tax treaties 
do not incorporate the PPT rule16. Thereafter, 
“clarificatory” draft commentary is provided 
which recognizes that domestic TAAR’s, 
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statutory GAAR’s and judicial doctrines can 
be used to counter treaty abuse. 
With respect to domestic TAAR’s, it is 
provided that if a conflict arises between 
a domestic TAAR and tax treaty the latter 
will prevail pursuant to Article 26 VCLT17. 
However, such conflicts can be avoided 
if: firstly, the treaty contains an express 
provision which allows the application of a 
domestic TAAR18; secondly, if the domestic 
TAAR gives a meaning to a term and that 
term in incorporated in a tax treaty because 
a reference is made to the domestic law to 
understand the treaty meaning of that term19; 
thirdly, it is stated that a conflict does not 
arise if treaty benefits are denied both under 
the domestic TAAR and the guiding principle 
or PPT rule20; lastly, a conflict does not arise 
if the benefits of tax treaties are denied 
under both domestic judicial doctrines and 
principles applicable to treaty interpretation 
coupled with domestic TAAR’s21. 
With respect to the interaction of domestic 
statutory GAAR’s with tax treaties, the draft 
commentary states that a conflict will not arise 
if: the treaty includes a specific provision for 
its application; or if the domestic statutory 
GAAR gives a meaning to a term and that 
term in incorporated in a tax treaty because 
a reference is made to the domestic law to 
understand the treaty meaning of that term; 
or if the domestic rule is in conformity with 
the guiding principle/PPT rule22. 
With respect to judicial doctrines (substance 
over form, economic substance, sham, business 
purpose, step transaction, abuse of law and 
fraus legis), it is stated that these interpretational 
principles do not conflict with tax treaties 
even though treaties have to be interpreted 
in light of the VCLT. The relevance of the 
guiding principle/PPT rule towards this 
approach is not discussed. 
The report also clarifies that CFC rules do not 
conflict with treaty provisions. This position 
is justified by the introduction of a US type 
Saving clause23. By referring to the Saving 
clause it is also clarified that exit taxes do 
not conflict with tax treaties24. 
III. The guiding principle and PPT rule – 
Selected issues 
1. Preliminary remarks 
The 2003/2014 OECD Commentary suggests 
that irrespective of the approach adopted to 
counter treaty abuse i.e. either through domestic 
anti avoidance rules25 or the interpretation 
approach, such measures should be applied 
taking into consideration the guiding principles 
that essentially is a treaty GAAR. Likewise, 
the 2014 TTA report provides that States 
can counteract improper use of tax treaties 
(treaty shopping and rule shopping) through 
the PPT rule. It is also stated at several 
occasions that domestic anti avoidance rules 
have to be applied in conformity with the 
guiding principle or the PPT rule. Thus, 
the guiding principle/the PPT rule are of 
paramount importance and their elements will 
be discussed hereafter in this contribution. 
2. The PPT rule and guiding principle vs Treaty 
TAAR’s 
The question arises as to how do these treaty 
anti abuse rules (GAAR and TAAR’s) interact 
with each other? In this regard, it should 
be noted that the 2014 TTA report provides 
that the PPT rules applies “notwithstanding” 
the other provisions of this Convention. In 
the author’s opinion, this is an unreasonable 
conclusion. If one applies the interpretation 
doctrine of lex specialis derogat legi generali 
then the treaty TAAR’s should prevail over 
treaty GAAR’s when such anti abuse rules 
apply to similar factual patterns. However, due 
to the use of the term “notwithstanding” the 
PPT rules becomes a self-standing provision 
and thus applies even if the transaction 
undertaken by the taxpayer passes the tests 
of the treaty TAAR’s26. 
If the treaty does not incorporate the PPT 
rule but only treaty TAAR’s then the question 
arises as to how these latter rules will interact 
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with the OECD’s guiding principle. In the 
author’s opinion, the OECD Commentary is 
not binding and the guiding principle should 
not be applied, especially, to tax treaties 
post 200327. The text of the treaty should 
carry more weight than the recommendations 
made to the OECD Commentary. Thus, if 
the taxpayer satisfies the treaty TAAR’s then 
the guiding principle should not be used to 
deny treaty benefits to the taxpayer. 
3. The subjective element 
Treaty benefits will be denied under the guiding 
principle/the PPT rule if it is proved that 
that “a main purpose” or “one of the principal 
purposes” for entering into the transaction/
arrangement (respectively) was to obtain a 
tax benefit. The OECD uses this terminology 
as opposed to “the main purpose” test or “the 
sole purpose” or “the predominant purpose”. 
This implies that, even if an arrangement has 
many main/principal purposes and to obtain 
a tax benefit was one of the main/principal 
purposes, the arrangement undertaken by 
the taxpayer will satisfy this test28. Thus, by 
providing for “a main purpose” or “one of the 
principal purposes” test the OECD provides 
for a low threshold to uphold the abuse of 
a tax treaty29. Accordingly, commentators 
have criticized this test as transactions with 
sufficient business purpose or economic 
substance may come under its scope30. 
In the author’s opinion, these low threshold 
tests as provided by the OECD should 
be replaced by “the main purpose” or “the 
principal purpose” test so that transactions 
which genuine economic objectives come out 
of the purview of the guiding principle/PPT 
rule31. This change will also be at par with 
the trend in the European Union to tackle 
aggressive tax planning. For instance, the 
European Court of Justice in the Halifax32 
judgment specified that tax benefits could be 
denied if “the essential aim” of the transaction 
is to obtain tax benefits that are abusive. 
Similarly, the European Commission in its 
various initiatives to counter aggressive tax 
planning recommends the use such similar 
“the essential purpose” terminology33. 
4. The objective element 
The objective element under the guiding 
principle/PPT rule provides that it needs be 
checked if the favourable tax position defeats 
the “object and purpose of the relevant” tax 
treaty provisions34. Tax avoidance structures 
typically aim to exploit the distributive rules 
(Art. 6-22) of tax treaties. Accordingly, the 
object and purpose of the relevant distributive 
rules needs to be ascertained before it can 
be established that a taxpayer’s transaction 
is abusive of (defeats) the objective of the 
relevant distributive rules35. 
Determining the object and purpose of the 
distributive rules is not a simple task. Arguably, 
the object and purpose of the distributive rules 
is to allocate taxing rights over the various 
items of income and capital amongst States. 
However, this objective is not of great help 
to ascertain whether a particular arrangement 
defeats the object and purpose of the relevant 
treaty provisions. This is because under a 
treaty or rule shopping arrangement or any 
other form of tax avoidance transaction – a 
taxpayer formally respects the conditions 
imposed by the relevant distributive rule 
but usually acts against the underlying spirit 
(intentions) of the treaty36. 
5. Burden of Proof  
With respect to the guiding principle, the 
2003/2014 OECD Commentary does not 
discuss as to which party is required to 
demonstrate that these two elements are 
satisfied. In this respect, the author submits 
that the tax authorities assume the burden 
of proof and they have to prove that the 
impugned transaction undertaken by the 
taxpayer satisfies both elements37. 
However this conclusion is different with 
respect to the PPT rule. Even though the 
tax authorities will be required to undertake 
objective analysis facts of the transaction 
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they only have to “reasonably” (and not 
convincingly) conclude that the subject element 
is satisfied38. This threshold seems to be low 
in comparison to the burden assumed by the 
taxpayer wherein it is required to “establish” 
(convincingly) that granting the benefit is 
in accordance with the object and purpose 
of the relevant provisions of the tax treaty. 
Thus the burden of proof is unbalanced39. 
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Consider a rule-shopping scheme wherein 
a taxpayer enters into an arrangement to 
transform taxable dividends (taxable at source 
under Article 10(2)) to treaty exempt capital 
gains on shares (exempt from tax at source 
under Article 13(5)). If the guiding principle/
PPT rule applies to this transaction then 
treaty benefits (the benefit of exempting 
from source taxation) shall not be granted. 
Does this mean that the item of income will 
be taxable as per the domestic law of the 
source State (for instance @ 35%) or can the 
taxpayer still invoke the provisions of Article 
10(2) (for instance @ 15%) and request for 
treaty relief? 
The OECD’s view is that the item of income 
should then be taxed as per the domestic law 
of the source State40. However, at the moment 
of writing this contribution, the OECD is 
considering as to whether the tax authorities 
should provide some sort of discretionary 
relief in the same manner as provided by 
the discretionary relief provision of the LOB 
clause?41 In the author’s opinion, treaty benefits 
under Article 10(2) should be granted to the 
taxpayer automatically rather than referring 
to a discretionary relief clause as it could be 
more burdensome for the taxpayer to seek 
relief under an administrative mechanism42. 
An interesting question also arises from the 
perspective of the residence State. Should the 
residence State provide relief (credit under 
Article 23) for the 15% tax levied by the source 
State (under Article 10(2)) even though from 
its perspective the item of income is taxable 
only in its State (under Article 13(5)). The 
wording of the guiding principle or the PPT 
rule does not provide any guidance on this 
issue. The OECD Commentary states that when 
conflicts of qualification arise from differences 
in domestic law then the residence State 
should provide relief from double taxation43. 
However, for qualification conflicts that arise 
due to differences in treaty interpretation, the 
OECD is of the view that the residence State 
should not provide relief automatically but 
through the mutual agreement procedure44. In 
the author’s opinion, the wording of Article 
23 does not make a difference between such 
conflicts. The provision simply states that 
relief shall be provided for income, which “in 
accordance with the provisions of this convention” 
is taxable in the other State. Therefore, as 
long as the source State taxes an item of 
income in accordance with the treaty, the 
residence State shall fulfil its obligations 
under Article 2345. 
IV. Conclusion 
The purpose of this article was to shed 
light on a few elements of the PPT rule and 
guiding principle. The author believes that 
these rules have their own limitations/issues 
and are open for subjective interpretations by 
taxpayers and tax authorities. This will lead to 
uncertainty and consequently to a significant 
increase in tax disputes. Thus, taxpayers 
should have the possibility to resolve such 
disputes under the mutual agreement procedure 
or the arbitration clause46. Accordingly, the 
framework suggested by the OECD in the 
context of BEPS Plan Action 14 on “making 
dispute resolution mechanisms more effective” 
will be extremely important. 
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